A ICT third-party service provider fails. A disruption impacts an important business process of a bank or insurer. The technical incident may be resolved quickly. Yet for the financial institution, crucial questions remain: Which business processes and functions were affected? What dependencies existed with other service providers? Who was informed when? And can the institution demonstrably show to the supervisor that it has the situation under control and has responded appropriately?
This is where the Digital Operational Resilience Act (DORA) steps in. The EU regulation has been applicable since 17 January 2025 and strengthens the digital operational resilience of banks, insurers, and other financial firms. It adopts a holistic approach. The focus is not only on securing individual ICT systems, but also on ensuring that financial institutions can remain operational and maintain critical business processes even during severe ICT disruptions. In this way, digital resilience becomes a corporate‑governance responsibility. The responsibility rests with the management body, which bears ultimate responsibility and cannot delegate it solely to IT, information security, or external service providers.
DORA goes beyond the traditional protection of IT systems against cyber attacks and technical failures. Financial firms must systematically identify, assess, manage, and monitor their risks arising from the use of information and communication technologies (ICT). To this end, DORA establishes a unified framework with five core areas of action: ICT risk management, handling and reporting of ICT‑related incidents, digital operational resilience testing, management of ICT third‑party risk, and voluntary information-sharing arrangements on cyber threats and vulnerabilities.
Specifically, this means that financial institutions must know which ICT systems and service providers support their critical or important functions, what dependencies arise from them, and which measures take effect in the event of a disruption. They must handle and report major ICT‑related incidents in accordance with regulatory requirements and regularly verify their resilience through appropriate testing. The link between technology and business processes is decisive. A technical failure becomes a business risk when, for example, payment transactions, securities settlement, or insurance services are affected. Emergency concepts, restart procedures, and crisis communication must therefore not only be documented, but also actually work in a real emergency.
DORA makes this clear: digital resilience is a prerequisite for the stability and reliability of financial services. Management, risk management, and supervision must be able to understand how risks are identified, assessed, and controlled.
DORA requires a shift in perspective: the governance of ICT service providers must not be limited to contract review and regular supplier assessments. It must take into account the actual risks and dependencies arising from ongoing operations.
A key focus area of DORA is the ICT third-party risk management concerning risks arising from ICT third‑party service providers. Financial institutions remain responsible for meeting their regulatory obligations—even when they outsource IT services to external providers. Therefore, they need a complete and up‑to‑date overview of their ICT services, the underlying contractual relationships, and the associated dependencies. Of particular relevance is which providers support critical or important functions and which additional companies are involved in service delivery through sub‑contracting.
This particularly concerns cloud, infrastructure, and managed services. The technical performance of a provider is not the only decisive factor. Equally important are transparent responsibilities, traceable operational processes, reliable information about sub‑contractors, clear reporting and escalation paths, as well as effective control and audit possibilities. Exit strategies and the option to transfer services to other providers or to provide them in‑house must also be appropriately taken into account.
DORA therefore requires a shift in perspective: the oversight of ICT service providers must not be limited to contract review and regular supplier assessments. It must take into account the actual risks and dependencies arising from ongoing operations. This requires close collaboration between business units, IT, risk management, information security, compliance, procurement, and senior management. Only when the relevant information is consolidated can financial institutions adequately assess their digital dependencies and make informed decisions.
Beyond the requirements for financial institutions, DORA introduces a European oversight framework for particularly significant ICT third‑party providers. The background is the increasing concentration on a few technology and infrastructure providers whose services are used by numerous financial firms. The failure of such a provider could affect large parts of the European financial sector. The European supervisory authorities—the European Banking Authority (EBA), the European Insurance and Occupational Pensions Authority (EIOPA), and the European Securities and Markets Authority (ESMA)—therefore assess, based on defined criteria, which ICT third‑party providers should be classified as critical.
These companies are referred to as Critical ICT Third-Party Providers (CTPPs). A dedicated European oversight framework applies to them. One of the three European supervisory authorities assumes the role of the so‑called Lead Overseer and coordinates the oversight. This includes, among other things, requests for information, general investigations, on‑site inspections, and the possibility to issue recommendations to improve risk management. The national supervisory authorities, for example BaFin, operate within the scope of their responsibilities as their respective supervisory responsibilities. For financial institutions, this provides an additional perspective: in addition to their own governance and supervision of their service providers, particularly relevant providers are now also directly considered at the European level.
Nevertheless, it remains important: designation as a CTPP is not a certification of DORA compliance and neither replaces the financial institution’s own risk analysis nor its due‑diligence, monitoring, and control obligations. It just adds an additional European supervisory layer to these obligations.
DORA only delivers its impact once regulatory requirements are translated into concrete processes, responsibilities, and technical measures. This includes coordinated incident management processes, documented controls, robust recovery procedures, and regular tests of digital operational resilience. Realistic failure scenarios must also be taken into account: what happens in the event of a disruption in a cloud region, the failure of central network or identity services, or when administrative accesses are no longer available? What impact does this have on the supported business processes? And how quickly can alternative operating or recovery measures take effect?
Such tests show whether technical recovery procedures, crisis communication, and business continuity actually interlock. It is crucial that the results are documented, weaknesses identified, and concrete improvement measures derived from them.
DORA is not isolated in this regard. Additional European regulations such as NIS2 and the AI Act may introduce additional, partly overlapping requirements on cybersecurity and the use of artificial intelligence, depending on their scope of application. For financial institutions, it is therefore becoming increasingly important to consider regulatory requirements consistently across technologies, service providers, and business processes. Existing governance and risk management structures should be further developed so that common topics such as information security, third‑party risks, responsibilities, and demonstrability can be managed in an integrated way.
For financial institutions, digital sovereignty is closely linked to the ability to understand and effectively manage technological dependencies. This includes transparency over data processing, access rights, operational locations, subcontractors, as well as control over essential operational processes and robust switching and exit options.
Cloud architectures must therefore not only be performant and scalable. They must also match the security, risk, and control requirements of the respective financial institution and be able to integrate into its existing governance and operational processes. Digital sovereignty does not mean giving up specific technologies or providers outright. Rather, it is essential that financial institutions know their dependencies, retain their control options, and remain able to act even when changes or disruptions occur.
This also applies to new technologies. Cloud, automation, and AI open up significant innovation potential. Their use, however, requires clear responsibilities, traceable decision processes, and appropriate controls. Thus, technological innovation and regulatory control can be combined.
We at T-Systems support financial institutions in translating regulatory requirements into viable technical and operational models. To do this, we combine consulting, cloud, and infrastructure services, cybersecurity and managed services for highly regulated markets. At the core are transparent responsibilities, robust operational processes, and the ability to manage risks and dependencies across the entire lifecycle of an IT service.
The designation of an ICT third‑party provider as CTPP by the European supervisory authorities underscores the particular importance of the supplier for the European financial sector. Within the Deutsche Telekom Group, this classification also concerns the responsibility associated with providing ICT services to financial companies. T‑Systems brings the perspective of an IT service provider that not only knows the requirements for transparency, resilience, and collaboration from the customer’s viewpoint, but must also incorporate them into its own operating and governance model.
DORA is therefore far more than a compliance project. The regulation creates a binding framework to make digital dependencies visible, to manage risks systematically and to ensure the operational capability of financial services companies even in crisis situations. We accompany financial institutions on this path—with infrastructure, operations, and security services that take resilience and controllability into account in the digital transformation. With our Industrial AI Cloud in Munich, a powerful European AI infrastructure is also available. This infrastructure supports the use of modern AI applications in a controllable and governance‑capable framework.